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Abstract 
Following the financial crisis, the UK introduced major structural reforms to address concern 
about Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks, while France and Germany adopted much weaker 
reforms. This is puzzling given the presence of large universal banks engaged in market making 
activities in all three countries which suffered significant losses during the international 
financial crisis, and given the commitments to reform made by political leaders in all three 
countries. The paper explains this policy divergence by analysing how dynamics of agenda 
setting contributed to the emergence of policy windows on structural reform. We explain the 
UK’s decision to delegate the process to an independent commission as an example of venue 
shifting which helped to insulate the process from industry framing, and resulted in ‘conflict 
expansion’ by mobilising a wider coalition of actors in support of bank ringfencing. By 
contrast, in France and Germany the agenda was tightly managed through existing 
institutional venues, enabling industry to resist the framing of the issue around TBTF and 
limiting the role of non-business groups – a process we label as ‘conflict contraction’. We 
argue that analysis of agenda setting dynamics provides new insights into the cross-national 
variability of business power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Following the global financial crisis, governments have imposed a raft of new regulatory 
instruments designed to strengthen the stability of the financial system, from higher capital 
requirements to tougher rules on banking standards (see introduction to this Special Issue). But 
the most persistent problem has been how to address the problem of Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF): 
the notion that some banks are simply so significant in economic terms that no government 
could permit them to fail. This in effect amounts to an implicit state subsidy and exacerbates 
risk-taking behavior through problems of moral hazard.1 The need to protect taxpayers by 
restricting the ability of retail banks to engage in higher risk trading activities was a central 
theme of the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh Summit.2 Yet efforts to develop a coordinated approach at 
the international level have been limited, with the result that countries have pursued their own 
reforms.3 The aim of this paper is to explain the divergence of structural reforms adopted in 
different countries, despite the shared nature of the TBTF problem and the commitment by 
political leaders to make banks safer at the height of the crisis. 
 
Our analysis focuses on the three European Union (EU) member states with the largest 
economies and banking systems: the UK, France and Germany. In the decades prior to the 
financial crisis, the banking systems of all three countries shared a number of important 
features.4 Governments and regulators championed the growth of large, universal banks 
engaged in ‘market-based banking’ activities, characterized by the rapid expansion of trading 
assets on bank balance sheets and increased dependence of banks on wholesale finance to fund 
lending.5 While hugely profitable, market-based banking also brought greater vulnerability and 
weakness to disruption in financial markets, meaning that relatively small losses were 
amplified by the banks’ large trading books.6 As a result, all three banking systems were hit 
hard by the financial crisis, resulting in a plummeting share price, credit rating downgrades and 
debt write-downs for many of the largest banks. It also necessitated unprecedented levels of 
state support, in the form of liquidity injections, government bail outs and credit guarantees.7   
 
At the height of the crisis, governments in all three countries came under sustained political 
pressure to crack down on their large banks. This was given added impetus by electoral 
dynamics, with national legislative elections taking place in the UK in 2010, France in 2012 
(legislative and presidential), and Germany in 2013. Political leaders in all three countries 
responded by making clear political commitments to pursue structural reform of the banking 
sector: in the UK, Prime Minister Cameron promised to curtail banks’ trading activities and 
established an Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) in 2010 to make policy 
recommendations; in France, President Hollande was elected in 2012 following a campaign 
that included a pledge to implement a full split between retail and investment banks; while in 
Germany, Chancellor Merkel moved to undermine opposition criticism by promising to 
introduce tough new ringfencing rules. Here, however, the similarity ends. In the UK, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government moved quickly in the face of fierce 
industry opposition. The reforms set out to ringfence banks’ retail activities in legally separate 
entities, prohibiting them from trading in a range of financial instruments, and imposing capital 
requirements significantly in excess of international or EU standards. By contrast, the French 
                                                 
1 HM Treasury (2012), 3. 
2 G20 (2009). 
3 Spendzharova (2016). 
4 Hardie and Howarth (2013). 
5 Hardie and Howarth (2013). 
6 Bell and Hindmoor (2015), 9. 
7 Woll (2014). 
and German governments chose to defend the interests of their largest banks and backtracked 
on their earlier commitment to substantial structural reform. In particular, both sought to 
implement much weaker measures which would force banks to ringfence only a narrow set of 
proprietary trading activities (see Table 1). Unlike the changes in the UK, which tightly 
circumscribe what universal banks can and cannot do, the reforms adopted in France and 
Germany do little to curtail the activities of the largest banks.8 
 
To explain this puzzle, the paper proceeds as follows. The next section details the explanatory 
limitations of prevailing theoretical accounts of financial regulatory reform. The second section 
presents our analytical framework which focuses attention on three key dynamics of agenda 
setting: issue framing, conflict expansion and venue shifting. By analysing each of these in 
turn, we set out to explain the opening / closing of policy windows on banking reform in the 
three countries over time. The conclusion reflects on the added value of our contribution to 
analysing business power and agenda setting dynamics. 
 
The limitations of Comparative Political Economy and Business Power approaches 
Existing approaches to financial regulation fail to provide a convincing account of the 
divergence in post-crisis structural reforms. We review the two main theoretical perspectives 
here. Explanations rooted in Comparative political economy (CPE) and Varieties of Financial 
Capitalism (VoFC) emphasize the institutional configuration of national economic and / or 
financial systems, suggesting that governments will seek to protect the comparative 
institutional advantage of industry.9 From this perspective, government preferences on bank 
structural reform should derive from features of the national banking system and the 
distributive implications of structural separation.  
 
However, it is difficult to square these assumptions with the pattern of post-crisis regulation 
found in the three countries. From a VoFC perspective, the UK (and US) is traditionally viewed 
as a neoliberal regime favoring light touch ‘market making’ regulation, based on a benign view 
of efficient markets.10 By contrast, France and Germany are frequently seen as having a ‘market 
shaping’ approach which assumes that financial markets are prone to instability and advocates 
constraints on the activities of banks.11 Paradoxically, however, it is the UK that has intervened 
decisively to address TBTF by restricting the trading activities of its largest global banks, 
thereby potentially placing them at a competitive disadvantage. By contrast, France and 
Germany have sought to protect their domestic financial interests, defending the universal 
banking model and leaving the market-based banking activities of their largest banks largely 
untouched.  
 
Moreover, we argue that CPE approaches present a structurally-deterministic explanation of 
national preferences, and thus fail to explain how or why these may change over time. In 
particular, explanations that rest on narrow economic advantage struggle to explain why the 
UK government actively cultivated political support for radical reform, while the French and 
German governments deliberately sought to dampen political pressure for change. We argue 
that this is because CPE accounts leave little room for the role of political agency or policy 
choice. The variability of regulatory outcomes ultimately reflects the heterogeneity of industry 
preferences, divisions amongst interest groups, and the discretion, autonomy and resources 
                                                 
8 Hardie and Macartney (2016); Spendzharova (2016). 
9 Zysman (1983); Hall and Soskice (2001); and for recent variations on VoFC see Hardie and Howarth (2013); 
Howarth and Quaglia (2016). 
10 Mügge (2011). 
11 Quaglia (2010). 
wielded by elected officials and national regulators.12 We seek to add value to these 
comparative accounts by applying an analytical framework better placed to capture how 
economic interests are mediated by political and bureaucratic actors, and channelled through 
institutional processes.  
 
A second theoretical approach focuses on the power of business, which derives from both the 
state’s structural dependence on firms for investment and growth, and the instrumental 
lobbying capabilities of business.13 In an important contribution, Culpepper argues that 
business power relies on ‘quiet politics’, characterized by low levels of public interest and 
informal governance arenas.14 However, as the salience of regulatory issues increases, the 
influence of economic interests declines as policy issues are escalated to ‘noisy’ political arenas 
and formal governance institutions. In this context, business power is more likely to be 
challenged by the mobilisation of other societal groups, such as consumers or taxpayers. 
Applying this framework to post-crisis reform, for instance, Bell and Hindmoor show how 
heightened salience, strengthened institutions and new ideas have constrained the power of 
large banks since the crisis, enabling regulators to impose tough new capital rules.15  
 
However, two important aspects of business power which remain under-specified. First, 
political salience is usually treated as an exogenous variable which constrains business power. 
But this tells us little about the conditions or causal factors that cause salience to vary over 
time. In order to do so, we need to treat salience as endogenous to explanations of business 
power. It is self-evident that interest groups do not simply respond to public pressure, but 
actively cultivate public awareness and political attention about issues. Moreover, the 
institutional context in which decisions are made shapes — as much as it is shaped by — 
political salience because certain venues are more visible and attract greater attention than 
others. Second, although business power helps to explain why policy change is possible in the 
face of determined industry opposition, less is known about the reverse process: how 
opportunities which appear ripe for policy change may be deliberately closed down. We know 
little about how issues become less salient over time, when non-business groups demobilize, 
or why issues are moved from ‘noisy’ public to ‘quiet’ private institutional venues. Here the 
influence of business may be more pernicious as it relates to the second face of power and 
‘non-decision making’:16 the ability of business to keep issues off the policy agenda or – more 
intriguingly – to have them deliberately downplayed.  
 
In the following section, we outline how an agenda setting approach addresses these points by 
providing a framework for analysing how business power is mediated by political processes. 
This has two advantages. First, the focus on agenda setting helps to explain the causal 
mechanisms through which policy issues, such as banking reform, become the focus of 
increasing (or decreasing) public salience and heightened (or declining) government attention. 
Second, agenda setting provides an agency-oriented account of policy stability and change by 
analysing the interaction of strategic policy actors within institutional opportunity structures. 
We argue that this potentially offers a richer account of how business power is mediated by 
political processes. 
 
Agenda setting approaches 
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13 Lindblom (1977); Block (1980); for a review, see Culpepper (2015). 
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16 Bachrach and Baratz (1962). 
Agenda setting examines the mechanisms though which policy issues rise and fall, and the 
conditions under which this produces policy stability and change.17 This analytical framework 
posits that long periods of policy continuity can be interrupted by sudden shifts or punctuations 
in the policy agenda.18 These are often associated with heightened public attention, leading to 
the ‘alarmed discovery’ of a new or existing issue by government.19 Similarly, Kingdon argues 
that policy change is most likely when policy entrepreneurs are able to couple policy problems 
with policy solutions at a particular point in time, creating a relatively short ‘window of 
opportunity’ for change.20 
 
Policy agendas are shaped by several factors. The first, conflict expansion, refers to the 
increased mobilisation of policy actors around an issue, beyond the narrow range of 
participants that normally occupy a policy subsystem.21 Conflict expansion can challenge the 
balance of power and resources that exists between powerful interests and coalitions, the 
stability of which underpins prevailing issue understandings and sustains particular policy 
outcomes. Second, policy choices are influenced by how an issue is defined or ‘framed’.22 
Policy framing refers to the process of selecting, emphasising and organising aspects of 
complex issues according to an overriding evaluative or analytical criterion.23 By re-framing 
an issue in a particular way, the link between policy problems and solutions can be redrawn 
and the boundary between opponents and supporters of a policy can be reconfigured. Third, 
institutional venues are central to our understanding of agenda setting. Institutions constitute 
opportunity structures which can underpin policy stability by granting access to certain actors, 
being more receptive to particular arguments, and formalising veto points. Policy change is 
most likely when debates and decision making shift to new institutional venues.24 By altering 
venues, new policy windows may open up as a different set of actors are empowered and 
different decision rules structure the process.25  
 
We explain how business power is mediated by the agenda setting process. Figure 1 
summarizes how the role and influence of large firms — in our case, banks — is shaped by the 
dynamics of issue framing, conflict expansion, and venue shifting. These three causal variables 
account for the emergence of policy windows; the opening or closing of which we argue helps 
to explain the diversity of banking reform across our three cases. On this basis, we would expect 
to find in the case of the UK that 1) banks were unable to prevent the framing of the crisis 
around the issue of TBTF, 2) a range of non-business groups mobilized around the banking 
reform issue, and 3) structural reform was managed through new or altered institutional venues. 
By contrast, in France and Germany, we would expect that 1) banks successfully re-framed the 
crisis away from TBTF banks, 2) the mobilisation of non-business groups was limited, and 3) 
structural reform was managed through pre-existing institutional channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Baumgartner and Jones (1993); Rochefort and Cobb (1994); Kingdon (1995); Jones and Baumgartner (2005). 
18 Baumgartner et al. (2006); Green-Pedersen and Jones (2006). 
19 Jones and Baumgartner (2005). 
20 Kingdon (1995). 
21 Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 
22 Rochefort and Cobb (1994). 
23 Daviter (2007), 654. 
24 Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 
25 Baumgartner et al. (2006), 968. 
Figure 1.  The mediation of business power by the agenda setting process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In methodological terms, our comparison of banking reform in the UK, France and Germany 
provides important advantages. The three cases are similar with respect to salience in that 
banking reform was at the top of the political agenda in the immediate aftermath of the financial 
crisis, and was given added impetus by the timing of important national elections. But they 
differ significantly with respect to basic political and institutional features which enables us to 
rule out alternative explanations. For example, we can exclude partisan explanations which 
would predict that left wing governments would be more likely to introduce radical structural 
reform than a right wing government. This is because coalition governments led by centre-right 
parties were in power in the UK and Germany at this time, whereas France had a socialist 
government. Another possibility is that structural reform is greater in countries where executive 
power is less constrained by legislative or judicial checks. Yet this does not fit with the 
empirical evidence: although Germany is traditionally characterized as a consensual system 
with limited executive power, the UK and France both share important features of 
majoritarianism.26 The comparison therefore promises to provide new insights into how 
identical policy issues are mediated by agenda dynamics which are independent of these basic 
political and institutional features, giving rise to divergent policy outcomes. 
 
Our analysis uses process tracing to chart the rise (and fall) of structural reform on the policy 
agenda of the three countries over time. The paper draws on a series of anonymized interviews 
conducted by the authors over a three-year period from 2014 and 2017. In total, approximately 
twenty-seven interviews were conducted with elected officials, senior regulators and banking 
industry representatives based in London, Paris, Berlin and Frankfurt. This evidence is 
corroborated by an extensive analysis of public documents, industry publications and financial 
media coverage of the banking reform process in the three countries.  
 
Policy windows for banking reform 
We begin with a brief overview of developments in each banking sector in the run up to the 
crisis. In the UK and France, the problem of TBTF was rooted in the concentrated, expansive 
and highly leveraged nature of the domestic-headquartered retail banking sectors.27 
Consolidation in the decade prior to the crisis meant that both the UK and French retail banking 
sectors were dominated by just four (five in the case of France before 2009) large universal 
banks which significantly expanded their balance sheets in the decade prior to the crisis.28 
While hugely profitable, this business strategy brought greater vulnerability to disruption in 
financial markets, meaning that relatively small losses were amplified by the banks’ large 
trading books.29 UK banks’ use of securitisation meant that they became highly leveraged, with 
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the average exceeding 35:1 by 2007,30 depleting their liquidity reserves and leaving them 
dependent on wholesale funding. When inter-bank lending dried up from late 2007, three UK 
banks (Northern Rock, RBS and HBOS) collapsed, while HSBC and Barclays were forced to 
write off huge volumes of toxic assets, with total bank sector losses reaching 6.3 percent of 
GDP in 2008-9. In response, the UK government acted to stem the contagion through 
emergency liquidity assistance and direct taxpayer support, culminating in the bail-out of two 
high-street banks. Although French banks were less exposed to securitisation or subprime 
assets, they were hit particularly hard by losses in southern European banks in which they had 
invested heavily prior to the crisis. Hence, although French bank losses overall were lower than 
in the UK as a proportion of GDP (1.8 percent), write-downs at individual banks (notably BNP 
Paribas, Societie General and Credit Agricole) were comparable to those of the largest British 
and German banks.31 In recognition of this, the government chose to shore up the banking 
system by recapitalising six of its largest institutions in return for commitments to maintain 
lending to the real economy. 
 
The German banking system is one of the least concentrated in Europe — thanks to a large 
number of smaller savings and cooperative banks, regional public banks (Landesbanks) and a 
number of smaller commercial banks. Despite this, banking reform was (briefly) a key concern 
for policy makers on account of the fact that the German system was one of the worst hit in 
terms of both total write-downs and write-downs to GDP.32 Several German banks faced 
substantial losses (totalling 2.4 percent of GDP) during the crisis, principally due to their 
purchase of securitized assets from US banks. For example, Deutsche Bank, one of Europe’s 
largest banks, recorded its first loss in fifty years, resulting in a plunging share price, huge debt 
write-offs and heralding years of upheaval. Four German banks, including the country’s third 
largest – Dresdner Bank – effectively collapsed, and only massive federal and regional 
government intervention – including the creation of a bad bank to soak up toxic assets and the 
purchase of shares – saved them. The regional Landesbanken, known for their domestic retail 
and commercial lending, were also severely impacted.  
 
In the aftermath of the banking crisis, the new Conservative-led coalition government in the 
UK moved swiftly to agree major reforms to bank structure. The Banking Reform Bill, passed 
in December 2013, requires bank retail activities to be placed in a separate and ‘operationally 
separable’ ringfenced subsidiary which is no longer permitted to trade most derivatives and 
securities.33 The ringfenced bank must also hold an additional ringfence capital buffer, taking 
total equity (tier 1) capital up to 10 percent. These reforms go significantly beyond international 
guidelines (Basel III), imposing some of the highest capital requirements in the world on UK 
banks. The UK’s actions are puzzling for two reasons. First, the Conservative party manifesto 
for the 2010 parliamentary elections made no explicit commitment to structural reform, 
pledging only to ‘pursue international agreement’ on banning forms of proprietary trading so 
as to avoid damaging the City’s competitiveness.34 Second, as much of the UK financial 
industry was at pains to point out, it was debatable that TBTF universal banks were a major 
problem. Although RBS had, in effect, been nationalized, other large universal banks like 
HSBC and Barclays had avoided direct taxpayer support. Moreover, some of the highest profile 
bank failures (HBOS, Bradford and Bingley, and Northern Rock) were a result of lax mortgage 
lending practices, not high risk market making activities. 
                                                 
30 ICB (2011), 128. 
31 Hardie and Howarth (2013), 132. 
32 Hardie and Howarth (2013), 103. 
33 HM Government (2013). 
34 Conservatives (2010). 
 The reforms introduced in France and Germany were significantly weaker than those 
implemented in the UK (see Table 1, in appendix).35 The reforms eventually agreed in 2013 
(in France) and 2014 (in Germany) only curtail large banks from engaging in a narrow set of 
proprietary trading activities.36 In France, for example, it is widely anticipated that this will 
have a minimal impact on bank business models.37 In the case of Germany, it is estimated that 
only one bank (Deutsche) is likely to be affected, and only marginally.38 The timidity of these 
changes is particularly surprising given the heightened public salience of banking reform, and 
the political commitments given by prominent political leaders to tackling the issue, in both 
countries at the height of the crisis. In France, the Socialist Party pledged to reform its largest 
banks during the 2012 presidential and legislative election campaigns. During the French 
presidential election campaign, François Hollande announced that his ‘main adversary was 
finance’ and made an explicit pledge to introduce the ‘separation of banking activities 
contributing to investment (or employment) and speculative operations’.39  
 
The leadership of the German CDU was more cautious with its statements on reform. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel announced in the aftermath of the crisis to consider ‘how to make 
sure that banks and financial institutions do not become so large that they ultimately pose the 
potential risk of exerting pressure on countries.’40 However, the CDU’s coalition partners, the 
CSU, came out more forcefully in favor of structural reform, while on the left support for 
ringfencing was near universal. In July 2012, SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel launched a vitriolic 
attack against the banks, calling for them to be broken up because they were holding countries 
to ransom and dictating government policy. Peer Steinbrück, finance minister of the Grand 
Coalition government from 2008 to 2013, and nominated as the SPD's challenger to Chancellor 
Angela Merkel for the 2013 elections, presented his own detailed set of proposals for banking 
reform in late September 2012. Even Philipp Rösler, minister of Economics and leader of the 
economically liberal Free Democratic Party, came out in favor of Steinbrück’s proposals, 
which were similar to the recommendations of the EU’s High-level Expert Group on Bank 
Structural Reform, chaired by Erkki Liikanen. However, despite the widespread political 
support for structural reform in Germany, the changes eventually adopted fell far short of the 
‘Liikanen Group’ proposals, and the timing of the reforms (adopted in early 2014) were seen 
as an attempt to pre-empt the adoption of an EU-level directive.41  
 
To explain the divergence of structural reform across our cases, we assess the extent to which 
a policy window for regulatory change opened in each of our three countries. We do so by 
assessing how the role and influence of the banking industry was mediated by the dynamics of 
                                                 
35 IMF (2013). 
36 Spendzharova (2016). 
37 The insignificance of the French reforms has been widely commented upon in the French press, by the 
rapporteuse of the special parliamentary committee created to examine the government’s draft law and by the 
banks themselves. See, for example, ‘La séparation bancaire en France, éléments historiques et arguments’, 
Médiapart, 20 October 2017; available at : https://blogs.mediapart.fr/erasmus/blog/201017/la-separation-
bancaire-en-france-elements-historiques-et-arguments 
38 ‘Germany rejects whole-bank ringfencing’, Financial Times, 30 January 2013. 
39 See for example, http://www.luipresident.fr/francois-hollande/60-engagements; 
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/01/26/francois-hollande-annonce-60-
engagements-pour-la-france_1634584_1471069.html;  http://www.leparisien.fr/election-presidentielle-
2012/candidats/hollande-au-bourget-mon-veritable-adversaire-c-est-la-finance-22-01-2012-1823639.php 
40 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/analysis-of-eu-report-recommending-big-banks-be-split-up-a-
859297.html 
41Hardie and Macartney (2016). 
the agenda setting process — our three explanatory variables — issue framing, conflict 
expansion, and venue shifting.  
 
Issue framing 
At the height of the crisis, the financial industry in the UK and France attempted to frame the 
issue of TBTF by presenting a united front in opposition to structural reform. Although the 
German banking industry was more divided on reform — given that none of the savings and 
cooperative banks were affected directly by it — both the association representing German 
commercial banks (BVD) and the association representing all German banks (Die Deutsche 
Kreditwirtschaft / German Banking Industry Committee, GBIC) were opposed to structural 
reform, including the Liikanen Group proposal.42 The largest banks in all three countries, 
represented by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) and the French Banking Federation 
(FBF) and the two German associations, sought to defend the universal banking model on the 
grounds that there was no evidence that it was an important cause of the financial crisis. They 
argued that universal banking lowered bank funding costs and reduced risk through 
diversification, and that reform would damage the economy and international 
competitiveness.43 In the case of France — where the large banks had a weaker capital position 
than the largest British banks — structural reform was presented as particularly dangerous and 
threatened foreign take-overs and a significant cut to lending to the real economy. In Germany, 
despite the importance of smaller savings and cooperative banks to retail banking, the largest 
commercial banks made similar claims.44 These arguments were supported by powerful 
business associations in all three countries (the UK CBI, the French MEDEF, and several 
German business associations) which warned that structural separation threatening the 
provision of trade finance to SMEs and would undermine the economic recovery.  
 
A major difference between financial industry efforts to water down structural reform was that 
while the French and German banks remained united in opposition to change, the UK banks 
did not. Once it became clear that the ICB favored some form of ringfencing, divisions between 
the main UK banks began to emerge. As reform threatened to impact on bank business models 
in different ways, individual banks faced incentives to lobby separately to try to secure firm-
specific concessions.45 Broadly speaking, the UK banking sector divided into two camps. 
Those with large investment operations — HSBC, Barclays, Standard Chartered and RBS — 
continued to defend universal banking.46 HSBC and Standard Chartered publicly threatened to 
move their headquarters to Asia, while Barclays speculated that it would shift its investment 
bank subsidiary to New York.47 In contrast, Lloyds and Santander UK, together with new 
challenger banks, were relatively relaxed about the prospect of structural reform because most 
of their business would fall within the ringfence. In fact, Lloyds took the strategic decision to 
break ranks and come out publicly in favor of ringfencing from the start.48 These sectoral 
divisions were also mirrored in the wider business community: while the CBI sought to 
represent the views of large manufacturers concerned about the impact on trade finance, the 
                                                 
42 See, for example: http://schulbank.bankenverband.de/newsroom/presse-infos/association-german-banks-
publication-european-commission-proposal-structural-reform-banking-sector/ 
43 Interview with bank lobbyists, London, 6 June 2013. 
44 http://schulbank.bankenverband.de/newsroom/presse-infos/association-german-banks-publication-european-
commission-proposal-structural-reform-banking-sector/ 
45 James (2017). 
46 Interview with bank lobbyist, London, 18 September 2013. 
47 Financial Times (2011) ‘Finance: Flight Delayed’, 14 April 2011. 
48 Interview with bank lobbyist, London, 22 May 2014. 
SME sector (represented by the FSB and BCC) supported structural reform on the grounds that 
it would bring greater financial and economic stability.49 
 
In France, despite significant differences in bank business models and the relative importance 
of trading activities in bank balance sheets, all four of the country largest banks — BNP 
Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole and BPCE (Banques Populaires, Caisses d’Epargne) 
— maintained a united front. They were joined by the main association representing big 
business in France, the MEDEF, which repeatedly noted the dangers of ringfencing to the 
French economy. In Germany, we might have expected greater divisions in the banking and 
non-financial industries, given the three-pillar banking system and profoundly different 
funding of both different banking types and non-financial companies. However, although only 
the large commercial banks undertook a concerted lobbying effort on structural reform, other 
parts of the banking sector were very supportive, and the associations representing savings 
banks (Finanzgruppe Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverban), cooperative banks (BVR) and 
the regional public Landesbanks (VÖB) all came out in favor of German universal banks.50 
The largest German commercial banks — notably Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank 
— maintained a common front on structural reform through the BDB. They were joined by DZ 
Bank, the second largest bank in Germany by assets and the main universal banking arm of 
German cooperative banks, and Dekabank, the main investment bank linked to the 420 German 
savings banks. In their opposition to structural reform, the banks were joined by all the main 
German business associations.51 
 
We argue that divisions fatally weakened the capacity of UK industry to prevent the framing 
of the financial crisis as being caused by TBTF banks, fuelled by the rapid expansion of high 
risk market trading activities. Consequently, this created a window of opportunity for other 
policy actors to frame the issue in their own terms. On the contrary, the largest French and 
German banks proved highly effective in defending the universal banking model by warning 
of the dangers to the real economy of reform. Ultimately, the powerful unity of the banking 
industry and the business community successfully deflected political attention away from the 
issue of TBTF banks.  
 
Conflict expansion 
The issue of banking reform became a highly salient issue in all three countries following the 
bank bail-outs in 2008, leading to mounting public criticism of the financial industry. This was 
compounded by a series of high-profile scandals which engulfed the sector from 2012, the most 
important of which involved the manipulation of interest and exchange rate swaps, and the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor). Investigations by the European Commission and 
national authorities led to the imposition of record fines on a number of prominent banks, 
including Barclays, Deutsche Bank and Société Générale.52 This created the perfect conditions 
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for conflict expansion, whereby we would expect a broad range of actors and societal groups 
to mobilize to push for tighter regulation aimed at curbing the excesses and illegal activities of 
the banks. Below we explain how and why significant conflict expansion took place in the UK 
context, but there was little evidence of conflict expansion in France or Germany. 
 
Conflict expansion in the UK was driven by three sets of actors. At the political level, the 
Liberal Democrats provided a constant source of political pressure for structural reform from 
within the Conservative-led coalition government. Business Secretary Vince Cable, the Liberal 
Democrats’ spokesperson on banking reform, was a firm supporter of ringfencing and regularly 
intervened to ensure that the TBTF issue remained at the top of the political agenda.53 Non-
financial groups also played an important agenda setting in the run up to the creation of the 
ICB. In particular, the consumer group Which? convened its own Future of Banking 
Commission in 2009 which brought together a number of experienced politicians to propose 
reforms to the industry.54 Its proposal that the core lending and deposit functions of UK banks 
should be ‘ringfenced’ placed the policy option firmly on the agenda and was influential in 
framing the thinking of the ICB.55 The third important source of pressure came from the 
bureaucratic level. Bank of England Governor, Mervyn King, viewed TBTF banks as a 
fundamental source of financial instability in the UK economy and advocated a full split 
between retail and investment banking activities, based on the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in the 
US.56 From the Bank’s perspective, strict separation would complement its new 
macroprudential role by reducing the risk and costs of future supervisory failure.57  
 
The Bank of England lobbied publicly and privately to hold the government to account on 
banking reform.58 During the early stages of the process, the central bank provided valuable 
advice to the ICB members during private sessions and produced research that was important 
in strengthening the hand of policy makers vis-à-vis industry. Following the publication of the 
ICB’s Final Report, senior Bank officials maintained pressure on the government by launching 
stinging attacks on bank lobbying tactics, while the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee urged 
ministers to implement the Vickers recommendations in full.59 Furthermore, the Bank worked 
closely with parliamentarians – particularly members of the Treasury Select Committee – in 
their efforts to strengthen the implementation of ringfencing rules in the Banking Reform Bill.60 
Consequently, a small number of powerful policy actors, principally led by the Bank of 
England, successfully expanded the conflict by mobilising a broad coalition of regulators, 
parliamentarians and non-business groups in favor of banking reform.61 In doing so they were 
able to challenge the industry’s defence of the status quo and re-frame the crisis explicitly in 
terms of TBTF banks. 
 
Efforts in France by political, bureaucratic and non-business groups to increase the salience of 
the TBTF issue was comparatively modest. No politicians with the political influence of Vince 
Cable, or the bureaucratic and intellectual influence of Mervyn King, spearheaded a campaign 
to reinforce the ring-fence. This is surprising given François Hollande’s loud and unambiguous 
promises during the presidential election campaign. In government, there was considerable 
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frustration within Socialist party ranks with the limited nature of the government’s proposed 
structural reform. This frustration resulted in a modest reinforcement of the government’s draft 
law through two amendments proposed by Socialist members of the parliamentary commission 
tasked to examine the legislation, although these amendments were of marginal significance.62 
The mainstream right in opposition in the lower house (UMP, Union for a Presidential 
Majority), came out strongly in favor of the Socialist-led government’s draft which eliminated 
any significant politicisation of the TBTF issue in parliament.63 In the defence of the 
government draft law, the Socialist Minister of Finance, Pierre Moscovici, argued that national 
economic interests and the interests of Paris as a financial centre had to be defended and that a 
stricter separation risked ‘giving a gift to Anglo-Saxon banks.’64 This conflation of large bank 
interests — as national champions — and national interests, was absent in the British debate 
on structural reform. The government’s decision to add structural reform into the same law 
focused principally upon the transparency of banks in their use of tax havens, further 
undermined the singular attention that the issue of structural reform attracted in the UK.  
 
Finally, the French technocratic elite also stood firmly behind the Socialist-led Government’s 
draft law. Bank of France governor, Christian Noyer, repeatedly came to the defence of the 
Socialist-led government, arguing that its reform plans were not ‘a minima’ and that a stricter 
separation, as adopted in the UK, would have been ‘against the national interest’ by weakening 
French banks.65 Unlike in the UK, where central bank officials facilitated parliamentary 
scrutiny of the final ringfencing legislation, parliamentary opposition to the government’s plans 
in France was limited to the extreme left, while media and academic engagement with banking 
reform was similarly muted.  
 
Efforts by German politicians, public officials or non-business groups to increase the salience 
of the TBTF issue were also limited in nature. The leader of the SPD, former Grand Coalition 
finance minister, Peer Steinbrück, supported the government’s draft law in 2013, despite his 
previous demands for significant structural reform. Only the Green Party and the far left De 
Linke actively criticized the Grand Coalition’s draft legislation as inadequate. The failure to 
widen conflict was despite a number of significant banking scandals involving Deutsche Bank 
which provided politicians with a huge amount of potential ammunition to challenge the 
country’s largest bank.66 There is also no evidence of bureaucratic actors (for example, top 
Bundesbank and BaFin officials) cultivating the salience of structural reform. Jens Weidmann, 
Bundesbank president, deemed the ringfencing recommendations of the Liikanen Group and 
the European Commission as ‘sensible’ but did not push actively on the matter and focused 
rather upon the reduction of ‘incentives to expand to ever greater size’ through systemic risk 
buffers and higher capital requirements for systemically important institutions.67  
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In the UK, political and bureaucratic actors deliberately cultivated the salience of banking 
reform through conflict expansion. This was achieved through a series of political actions 
designed to mobilize new coalitions of support in favor of structural separation and to re-frame 
the issue around TBTF and financial stability. In contrast, there was little evidence of conflict 
expansion in France or Germany. Political efforts to increase the salience of banking reform 
were limited to a small number of left-wing politicians with marginal influence in parliament. 
Moreover, prominent bureaucratic actors (notably, central bank officials and senior financial 
regulators) actively sought to play down concerns about TBTF banks and, more often than not, 
echoed many of the arguments put forward by industry. To understand why, we need to 
examine the institutional venues through which banking reform was managed.  
 
Venue shifting 
We argue that the institutional context was also critical to the opening of a policy window on 
banking reform in the three countries. In the UK, political imperatives in early 2010 created 
the conditions for venue shifting with the establishment of the Independent Commission on 
Banking (ICB). The turmoil of the financial crisis and the fiscal burden of bailing out two of 
the UK’s largest banks meant that protecting taxpayers became an acute electoral priority for 
all the main political parties. However, this task was complicated by the outcome of the 2010 
general election which led to the formation of a coalition government between the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrats with diametrically opposed views on what form reform should take. 
The decision in June 2010 to establish the ICB under the former Bank of England Chief 
Economist, Sir John Vickers, was a political solution that suited both parties:  the 
Conservatives, sceptical of any change hoped to delay and dilute reform; while the Liberal 
Democrats viewed an independent process as more likely to propose major reforms. The ICB 
was tasked with making recommendations on structural and non-structural measures that 
would promote both stability and competition in banking.68 The second institutional innovation 
resulted from the Libor rate-rigging scandal in mid-2012. Under pressure from the Liberal 
Democrats to respond, the government agreed to establish a Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards (PCBS) in September 2012, chaired by independent-minded Conservative 
MP Andrew Tyrie. Crucially, the PCBS was also given responsibility for completing pre-
legislative scrutiny of the Banking Reform Bill.  
 
Venue shifting to the ICB and PCBS widened the policy window for banking reform in four 
ways. First, delegation of critical stages of the process to ‘independent’ bodies helped to 
insulate policy makers from attempted industry framing. The Vickers process in particular was 
less conducive to traditional political lobbying because its high-profile membership was 
‘independent minded’, and it demanded a level of technical expertise which traditional trade 
associations did not have.69 Second, by extending the consultation and scrutiny processes, the 
ICB and PCBS were able to accumulate extensive knowledge and expertise. The ICB was well-
resourced by the standards of British parliamentary commissions with a 14-strong secretariat 
drawn mainly from the Treasury and Bank of England. To reduce its dependence on 
information supplied by the banks, the ICB issued two separate calls for evidence to elicit 
analysis from a range of expert sources. These informational resources enabled the ICB to 
consider the full spectrum of reform options and to directly rebut industry estimates of the 
economic costs of ringfencing.70  
 
                                                 
68 ICB (2010). 
69 Interview with bank lobbyists, London, 6 June 2013. 
70 The Guardian, ‘Banks put yearly bill for radical reforms at £15bn’, 20 March 2011. 
Third, the two commissions reconfigured the rules of the game to facilitate conflict expansion. 
The ICB created a structured process of engagement involving closed, private evidence 
sessions with individual banks, calls for written evidence, public roadshows and debates, and 
formal hearings with senior bank executives.71 This was designed to mobilize a broad range of 
policy actors, including representatives of small businesses, consumer groups and charities, in 
an effort to secure wider public legitimation and push back against industry influence. Finally, 
venue shifting generated commitments which were politically binding on government. 
Although the ICB’s recommendations were not legally binding, the credibility of the process 
and the status of its membership minimized ministers’ room for discretion when it came to 
implementation.72 Similarly, the PCBS provided a public platform for senior officials to reopen 
fundamental questions about structural reform.73 Under the threat of further amendments in the 
House of Lords, the Treasury relented to the PCBS’s demands to toughen the Bill by granting 
regulators additional ‘reserve powers’ to forcibly break-up individual banks if they breach the 
new rules (known as ringfence ‘electrification’). 
 
In the case of France, there was little if any attempt at venue shifting. French political and 
technocratic elites repeatedly presented the financial crisis as a consequence of the excesses of 
Anglo-American investment banking.74 From this perspective, there was therefore no need to 
overhaul France’s regulatory or supervisory framework for banks. The main non-parliamentary 
venue for the consideration of banking reform was the Comité consultatif du secteur financier 
(CCSF). Crucially, unlike the ICB in the UK, this was not a new body and it lacked meaningful 
independence from government: the CCSF was a committee of the Ministry of Finance created 
prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, which involved representatives from the ministry, 
the financial sector, consumer groups and independent financial experts.75 This committee, 
which met monthly, considered bank structural reform, among dozens of major financial issues, 
but did not dedicate significant time to examining the issue until 2013, after the proposal of the 
draft law. The CCSF then focused on specific matters, in order to add helpful details to the law.  
 
The parliamentary commission that examined the draft law provided the potential for venue 
shifting. However, the commission consisted of 14 National Assembly deputies and Senators, 
only two of whom — the Socialists, Laurent Baumel and Karine Berger, the commission 
rapporteuse — could be seen to be even moderately critical of the government’s draft law.76 
The commission proposed only two amendments which very slightly reinforced the 
ringfencing required by the draft law. The commission failed to interview any government or 
bank official or independent expert. The rate manipulation scandal (Libor Euribor and Tibor) 
resulted in two French banks being placed under investigation by the European Commission 
which imposed fines on Société Générale. However, unlike in the UK, this scandal neither 
resulted in significant domestic political debate nor resulted in the organisation of a special 
parliamentary commission and thus failed to increase the political salience of TBTF banks. The 
absence of venue shifting in France meant that the standard channels of bank influence in 
France remained and, notably, the interpenetration of elites.  In late 2012, the heads of three of 
the country’s five largest banks were former Treasury officials, had served as financial advisors 
to the president or prime minister and were members of the elite Financial Inspection:  Xavier 
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Musca (Crédit agricole, former head of the French Treasury), Gilles Briatta (Société Générale), 
Michel Pébereau (BNP Paribas). 
 
In Germany, an opportunity for venue shifting did arise at the start of the crisis. From 2008 to 
2011, the Merkel government established an ‘Expert Commission’ (Expertenkommission) 
called the ‘Neue Finanzmarktarchitektur’ or Issing Kommission, named after its chair, the 
former chief economist and European Central Bank Executive Board member, Ottmar Issing. 
It consisted of a small number — at most six members including Issing — of very high-level 
public sector and academic experts on finance. But the principal focus of the Commission was 
reforms at the international level, and specifically it sought to make recommendations for a 
new financial framework and systemic risk control that would be adopted at the G20 level. Its 
focus was not domestic per se, although a number of recommended international guidelines 
would have to be introduced at the EU and national levels.77 It therefore dedicated surprisingly 
little time and resources to the issue of bank structural reform.78 Although the Commission 
continued working in an unofficial capacity from 2011,79 it did not contribute in any direct and 
/ or official way to the Merkel government’s 2013 draft law on structural reform.  
 
In parliament, only the small German Green party called for the creation of an independent 
commission similar to the British ICB with a remit to focus on structural reform, especially for 
the largest, systemically important German banks.80 However, this proposal was blocked by 
the governing Grand Coalition. The Bundestag created a special commission to focus upon the 
management of specific failed institutions — notably HRE and Dresdner Bank — but this 
commission did not examine broader banking reform issues. The German law on structural 
reform was discussed and debated in the select committee on financial affairs of the Bundestag 
(Finanzausschuss). However, this committee and the economics and financial committee of 
the Bundesrat (upper house) passed no amendments to the government’s draft law — which 
was presented as ‘a fait accompli’.81 As for the Libor scandal, no dedicated committee / 
commission was established by parliament. There was a day-long hearing in 
the Finanzausschuss in November 2012 (28 November 2012).82 Infamously, the head of 
Deutsche Bank, Anshu Jain, was invited to appear before the select committee to answer 
questions on his bank’s involvement in rate manipulation but he failed to show up and there 
was no subsequent follow up.83 Only members of the marginal Green and De Linke parties 
drew a link between the rate manipulation scandal at Deutsche Bank and the need for major 
structural reform.84 
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Venue shifting is therefore critical to explaining the divergence in policy outcomes across our 
three cases. In the UK, political imperatives – the inconclusive outcome of the 2010 election 
and the Libor scandal – led to the issue of banking reform being removed from the 
government’s immediate control and placed into the hands of independent expert commissions. 
By helping to insulate the process from industry lobbying, and facilitating the mobilisation of 
a broader coalition of non-business interests, venue shifting widened the policy window for 
banking reform. In the case of France and Germany, however, banking reform was largely 
managed through pre-existing institutional venues which lacked meaningful independence 
from government and therefore did not challenge the influence of powerful banking interests. 
These venues enabled government ministers and the financial industry to maintain de facto 
control of the structural reform agenda, thereby narrowing and limiting the window of 
opportunity for policy change. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to explain the divergence of bank structural reform between, on the 
one hand, the UK, and, on the other, France and Germany. This is puzzling because all three 
cases shared a number of important economic and political features, including: the growth of 
market-based banking prior to the financial crash; large banks which required unprecedented 
levels of state support during the crisis; and national elections that led political leaders to pledge 
to clamp down on banks’ trading activities. In response, the UK government introduced new 
ringfencing rules, requiring a major overhaul of banks’ trading activities and capital 
requirements beyond those necessitated by EU or international standards. By contrast, the 
French and German governments backtracked on their earlier commitments to introduce 
ringfencing, implementing weaker measures targeting a narrow set of proprietary trading 
activities, and which were designed to avoid the imposition of much tougher EU rules. 
 
Using an agenda setting framework, the paper explains policy divergence by examining the 
rise (and fall) of structural reform on the policy agenda. By analysing three key agenda 
dynamics – issue framing, conflict expansion and venue shifting – it explains how and why the 
policy window for structural reform widened in the UK over time, but gradually narrowed in 
France and Germany. We argue that by delegating the issue of structural reform to the ICB and 
the PCBS, the UK government engaged in venue shifting. Although this was largely motivated 
by political expediency, it ultimately helped to insulate the process from industry framing away 
from TBTF, and facilitated conflict expansion by mobilising a wider coalition of actors around 
ringfencing. In the case of France and Germany, however, the agenda was tightly managed by 
government as the issue of structural reform was channelled through existing institutional 
venues. This minimized the scope for conflict expansion by limiting the mobilisation of non-
business groups, and enabled the financial industry to successfully frame the crisis as a problem 
of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ banking, not large universal (European) banks. 
 
The paper contributes to the business power literature by embedding our study in a comparative 
analysis of the policy process. We argue that this adds value in two ways. First, it builds upon 
recent work which emphasizes the contingency and variability of business power over time, 
rather than relegating it to a constant background condition.85 In particular, the findings point 
to the way in which the influence of large firms is mediated by political and bureaucratic actors, 
and channelled through institutional processes. Second, we seek to endogenize issue salience 
rather than treat it as an exogenous variable. Viewed through the lens of key agenda setting 
dynamics, we get a richer understanding of how and why business power can be challenged (or 
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entrenched) by key policy actors using policy processes to cultivate (or contain) issue salience. 
Theories of the policy process have not been integrated into business power approaches thus 
far, and we hope to demonstrate that employing analytical tools from this field can provide 
valuable new insights. 
 
Our study also adds value to the policy agenda literature by responding to the call for further 
analysis of agenda setting from a comparative perspective (Baumgartner et al. 2006). 
Comparative analysis is better placed to explain, rather than simply describe, the causal factors 
that shape policy change. By examining shared policy issues on a cross-national basis, it is also 
well suited to explaining instances of both policy change and non-policy change: that is, how 
and why policy windows open in some countries, but close or fail to open in other countries.86 
In this respect, our comparative analysis of banking reform points to the importance of 
dynamics of both conflict ‘expansion’ (in the UK) and conflict ‘contraction’ (in France and 
Germany). We define the latter as a process by which a policy issue becomes less prominent 
on the policy agenda. In the case of bank structural reform in France and Germany, conflict 
contraction was characterized by the decline or demobilisation of actors around the policy 
issue. This resulted from the particular framing of the banking reform issue (so that it appealed 
to fewer actors) and the choice of existing institutional venues (which limited access and 
entrenched the power of vested interests, here the representatives of large banks). Our analysis 
suggests that, like conflict expansion, contraction can be generated endogenously through the 
actions of policy actors. Intriguingly, it also points to the fact that this action can be either 
intentional or unintentional – indeed, in the UK case, we argue that conflict expansion was the 
unintended consequence of venue shifting. Further analysis of the role of venue shifting, 
conflict expansion and conflict contraction would therefore make an important contribution to 
our understanding of post-crisis financial regulatory reform. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Overview of bank structural reforms in the UK, France and Germany 
UK France Germany 
 
UK banks’ retail activities 
— defined as deposits, small 
business lending and 
payment systems — to be 
placed in a ringfenced 
subsidiary 
 
Ringfenced retail bank no 
longer permitted to engage 
in trading of derivatives and 
securities, provide services 
to other financial companies, 
or services to customers 
outside the EEA 
 
Ringfenced entity to have 
independent governance, be 
legally separate and 
operationally separable 
 
 
French banks and 
subsidiaries of foreign banks 
to locate certain speculative 
trading and investment 
activities into separately 
funded subsidiaries 
 
Banks can keep the bulk of 
trading activities, such as 
market-making, with the 
deposit taking part of the 
bank  
 
Ringfenced entity is banned 
from high-frequency trading 
and commodity derivatives 
trading.  Retail deposits can 
thus continue to fund the 
bulk of speculative activities 
 
German banks and 
subsidiaries of foreign banks 
to locate proprietary trading 
activities into a legally, 
economically and 
organisationally separate 
company 
 
Applies to banks with ‘risky’ 
activities (e.g. 
proprietary/high frequency 
trading, hedge fund financing) 
that surpass €100bn in value 
or 20% or more of their 
balance sheets 
 
Deposit-taking credit 
institutions can undertake 
proprietary trading for clients, 
although regulators can 
demand separation in 
individual cases 
 
